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          This paper tests for agency problems between the lead arranger and syndicate 
participants in the syndicated loan market.  One problem comes from adverse selection, 
whereby the lead arranger has a private informational advantage over participants.  A 
second problem comes from moral hazard, whereby the lead arranger puts less effort in 
monitoring when it retains a smaller loan portion.  Applying an instrumental variables 
strategy, I find that borrowers’ performance is influenced by the lead’s share.  Dynamic 
tests extract active contributions made by the lead, supporting a monitoring interpretation.  
Loan covenants serve as a mechanism to induce the lead arranger to monitor. 
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Financial innovations that have supported credit risk sharing markets have arguably helped
to make ￿nancial intermediaries better diversi￿ed and improved welfare. Reductions in
committed capital and a greater ￿exibility in reallocating this limited capital are re￿ected
in greater access to credit and lower ￿nancial transaction costs for borrowers (IMF, 2006;
Rajan, 2005).
But credit risk sharing results in agency problems between informed lenders and out-
side investors. One asymmetric information problem comes from hidden information via
adverse selection. An informed lender has an incentive to of￿oad loans that it privately
knows are poor quality. A second problem comes from hidden action via moral hazard in
effort. A lender with a lower portion of a loan will have a dampened incentive to carry
out due diligence and monitor the borrower over time. To curb these problems, economic
theory shows that the lender should invest its scarce capital into the loan. In the case of
adverse selection, this provides a credible and positive signal by an informed party to out-
siders (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Similarly and in the case of moral hazard, this exposes the
delegated monitor to losses if it fails to suf￿ciently monitor the borrower. The credibility
the lender gains from retaining exposure to the borrower encourages other participants to
provide funds, relying on the monitoring effort of the delegated monitor (Diamond, 1984;
Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
To assess whether and how an informed lender or a delegated monitor can mitigate
the problems associated with asymmetric information, this paper examines the syndicated
loan market. Syndicated loans are loans where a group of two or more lenders extend
credit to a borrower, governed by one loan contract. Syndicated lending shares properties
of both traditional relationship lending and market-based lending. Borrowers repeatedly
access the market, and often engage the same lenders. These ￿lead arrangers￿ ￿ typically
commercial or investment banks ￿ are responsible for arranging the loan, taking a share,
drafting an information memorandum, and inviting participant lenders. A priori, therefore,
the lenders are not equally informed; and in practice, participant lenders also rely on the
monitoring efforts of the lead arrangers after the loan is syndicated.
There are a number of advantages to using data on syndicated loans. The set-up lends
itself to agency problems, because asymmetric information can potentially exist at two
points in the syndication process: When the loan is closed, the lead arranger may have
private information that participants do not; and over the course of the loan, the lead ar-
ranger learns more about the borrower if it is incentivized to monitor well. In the latter
2view, the lead takes actions to prevent risk-shifting and opportunistic behavior by the bor-
rower, and it makes ￿exible re￿nancing decisions. This theoretical motivation can be
mapped into available empirical measures: the share of the loan retained by the lead ar-
ranger can be observed by the researcher, and the dynamic nature of the syndicated loan
market can be exploited to unearth whether monitoring is the important source of the prob-
lem. An additional advantage of using syndicated loan data is that there is considerable
variation in the exposure that lead arrangers have to borrowers. Moreover, ￿rms of varying
credit quality and information opacity access this market (Su￿, 2007; Dennis and Mullin-
eaux, 2000; S&P, 2006).
Like other credit risk sharing markets, syndicated lending rapidly expanded over the
past two decades and sharply contracted with the onset of the 2007-2009 ￿nancial crisis.
For example, annual syndicated loan issuance by U.S. borrowers increased from $130 bil-
lion in 1987 to close to $2 trillion in 2006, before falling to roughly $900 billion in 2008.
Concurrent with this decline was a jump in problematic syndicated loans and an overhang
of legacy loans with weak underwriting standards as reported in the annual Shared National
Credits review.1 A number of related trends characterized syndicated lending in the period
before the 2007-2009 crisis. First, there was a rise in the prevalence of nonbanks, and
particularly as participant lenders on funded term loans (as compared with credit lines).
Nonbanks include ￿nance companies, hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds,
and sponsors of structured products like collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). A related
trend was the rise in leveraged loans many of which were funded by nonbanks; leveraged
loans are de￿ned as loans priced at 125 basis points or more above LIBOR (Ivashina and
Sun, 2010; S&P, 2006). A third trend was the growth of the secondary loan market in
which some syndicated loans, among other loans, trade after they have been closed and
allocated. The U.S. secondary loan market volume reached $240 billion in 2006 (Drucker
and Puri, 2009).
This study identi￿es evidence of asymmetric information problems in the syndicated
loan market, by relating a borrower’s longer run performance after syndication to the lead
arranger’s share of the loan. The hypothesis is that when the lead retains a greater share,
problems of information asymmetry are moderated and should be re￿ected in improved
later performance by the borrower. I follow a two-pronged empirical approach by con-
trolling for a wide range of observable characteristics at the time of syndication (loan con-
tract, borrower, industry, and lender characteristics), and by applying an instrumental vari-
1See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/snc/.
3ables research design similar to Ivashina (2009).2 This approach is important because an
unconditional correlation could be due to reverse causality, in that the lead arranger may
hold more of a good quality loan, and it is publicly observed to be good quality at the time
of syndication. At the same time, the correlation could go against identifying an asym-
metric information effect if the lead holds more of a poor or opaque quality loan because
it is forced to do so by participants concerned about shirking by the lead (as theoretically
motivated by Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; and empirically
supported by Su￿, 2007 among others).
The distinct contribution of this study is in identifying that moral hazard in monitoring
is the empirically relevant problem. The existing literature largely stops on evidence of in-
formation asymmetry, and lumps together adverse selection and moral hazard explanations.
To this end, I isolate measures that are expected to be more valuable from a monitoring in-
terpretation. In this view, the lead arranger makes an active contribution to the borrower’s
performance when it is suf￿ciently induced to monitor the project and in￿uence manage-
ment decisions over time. In practice, monitoring includes ongoing communication with
management, determining the frequency of cash ￿ow inspections, observing deposit his-
tory, managing credit line availability and drawdowns, and monitoring compliance with
loan covenants. Many of these tests are motivated by the dynamic relationship between
borrowers and lead arrangers, where it is possible to observe whether the lead can make
￿exible re￿nancing decisions as it learns about the borrower. Having an actively informed
lender is also shown to be most valuable for borrowers in times of tight market liquidity
when constrained borrowers can turn to their lenders for backstop liquidity.
A matching contribution of this paper is in showing that loan covenants are an import-
ant mechanism through which the lead arranger is induced to monitor. These terms and
conditions in the loan contract are designed to mitigate agency problems at some future
point in time. I ￿nd that the sensitivity of a borrower’s performance to the lead arranger’s
share is greater when a loan has more covenant constraints. Applying an instrumental vari-
ables strategy, I also ￿nd that loan covenants go together with a greater lead share. In this
way they are not substitutes but serve as ￿tripwires￿ for the delegated monitor, as predicted
by the theory developed by Rajan and Winton (1995).
The rest of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 brie￿y reviews the associated
2Valid instruments should affect the lead’s demand but should not be correlated with the degree of adverse
selection or moral hazard in the syndicate. The instruments have a lending limit interpretation, in that
lenders vary in their organization’s internal risk limits. The instruments are constructed using information
on the lender’s previous syndicated loans as well as its exposure in a separate market, that for mortgage
securitizations and sales.
4theoryandempiricalliterature. Whatfollowsisadiscussionofthedataandmethodapplied
in Sections 3 and 4. The results are laid out in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 offers some
concluding thoughts.
2 A Review of the Related Theory and Evidence
It has long been recognized that problems of asymmetric information are common in credit
markets. For example, Schumpeter (1939, page 116) states that ￿...the banker must not
only know what the transaction is which he is asked to ￿nance and how it is likely to turn
out but he must also know the customer, his business and even his private habits, and get,
by frequently ‘talking things over with him’, a clear picture of the situation.￿
Banks developed naturally as delegated monitors; by holding loans and being fully ex-
posed to the credit risk, and monitoring the loans on behalf of their many investors (or
depositors). Recognizing that the moral hazard problem is one step removed when banks
serve as delegated monitors, Diamond (1984) was the ￿rst to resolve the problem of who
monitors the monitor. Monitoring the delegated monitor is not necessary as long as the
monitor is adequately large and diversi￿ed. Scale economies in monitoring (e.g., a ￿xed
cost), small investors relative to the size of the investment project, and low costs of del-
egation are among the sources of comparative advantage for the bank. In Diamond’s
framework, loans are perfectly illiquid both because costly monitoring has to be incurred
again by the loan buyer and because there is an adverse selection in the type of loan that
the bank chooses to sell.
Recognizing that outside investors, however, also lend directly to the borrower and that
loans are at least partly liquid ￿ partly because of high costs of intermediary capital ￿ Gor-
tonandPennacchi(1995)andHolmstromandTirole(1997)derivetheincentivecompatible
return that an intermediary should get in order to be a credible monitor.3 Uninformed in-
vestors undertake no monitoring themselves and their returns are entirely determined by the
intermediary’s monitoring effort. Once they know the bank is monitoring and has invested
suf￿cient capital, then they too invest in the project.
3These papers focus on monitoring. Other papers like Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) and Parlour and
Plantin (2008) look at the feasibility of loan sales and securitizations in the presence of adverse selection.
52.1 Evidence of Information Asymmetry in Credit Risk Sharing Mar-
kets
A number of papers provide empirical support for the theory on asymmetric information
problems. To cite a few, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Jones et al (2005) and Su￿ (2007)
￿nd that lead arrangers retain a larger share and the syndicate is more concentrated when
borrowers are opaque or risky. They also ￿nd that the lead arranger’s reputation helps to
partly mitigate asymmetric information problems. Lead arrangers’ reputation is not static,
however, and suffers when its borrowers do poorly (Gopalan et al, 2009). Reciprocity
between lenders on a syndicated loan also alleviates agency problems (Cai, 2009).
Does a more concentrated syndicate structure translate into better outcomes? A large
part of the existing literature has focused on pricing and short-run market reactions. With
respect to loan pricing, Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Focarelli et al (2008), Ashcraft and
Santos (2009) and Ivashina (2009) ￿nd a negative relation between the informed lender’s
share and loan spreads; Ivashina’s contribution is that she instrument’s the lead’s share us-
ing exogenous shifts unique to the credit risk of the lead’s loan portfolio.4 Short-run equity
market reactions are also negative when the lead arranger retains less exposure (Focarelli et
al (2008) in the case of syndicated loans, and Dahiya et al (2003) in the case of loan sales).
An under-explored area in the empirical literature is whether a greater lead exposure
shows up in a material improvement in the borrower’s performance, and if so, through
what mechanism.5 The closest study addressing this question is that by Dahiya et al
(2003) that ￿nds that the negative certi￿cation at the time of a secondary loan sale is borne
out in later poor borrower performance. Many of the ￿rms ￿le for bankruptcy within three
years of the loan sale, even though they are not the weakest ￿rms at the time of sale. More
recently, Berndt and Gupta (2009) track syndicated loans sold in the secondary market
and ￿nd that they have lower risk-adjusted returns over the three year period following
the sale. There remains, however, much scope for more analysis in this area. First, the
source of information asymmetry has not been identi￿ed in these studies (Dahiya et al
implicitly attribute their ￿nding to a negative signal but it is equally consistent with less
monitoring). Second, loan sales are not instrumented, so their interpretation is susceptible
to reverse causality. Third, the syndicated loan sales data do not indicate actual trades,
only quotations (Drucker and Puri, 2009). Therefore, it is dif￿cult to assess if the poor
4In the case of Ashcraft and Santos (2009), the relationship is between the loan spread and the lead’s ease
of hedging the borrower’s credit risk (as proxied by the introduction of a credit default swap on the borrower).
5I limit this discussion to corporate borrowers. There has been a recent proliferation of papers on the
certi￿cation effect in the mortgage securitizations market (e.g., Keys et al, 2010).
6performance was expected by the market and properly priced in at the time of the loan sale.
3 Data
Data on individual syndicated loan facilities for U.S. corporate borrowers were collected
from Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan database (December 2008 extract from
Dealscan’s online LoanConnector service). LPC gets the majority of this data from loan
agreements and commitments in ￿lings with the SEC as well as from loan originators, bor-
rowers and other contacts within the credit market. Lenders have an interest in maintaining
their rankings in LPC’s league tables, and therefore voluntarily report their loans, which are
then con￿rmed. As noted in a number of previous studies, syndicated loans in Dealscan
cover a majority of the value of commercial loans in the U.S. The unit of observation in
Dealscan is a loan, also known as a facility or a tranche. A borrower may issue more than
one loan on the same date, and often these are grouped together into packages or deals. In
the analysis that follows, the unit of observation is a loan.6
Descriptive statistics on syndicated loans to U.S. borrowers are shown in Table 1, and
variable de￿nitions follow in the appendix. Summary statistics are presented for the
sampleof loansissuedin theperiod from1990to 2006, whichcoincides withtheregression
sample.7
Dealscan data is used for the following categories: loan contract characteristics, syn-
dicate group characteristics, some of the borrower characteristics, as well as a number of
instruments (see Section 4 for how the instruments were constructed). The key variable of
interest is the share retained by the lead arranger. The average share held by the lead is
roughly one-third of the loan, with considerable variation (25% standard deviation). The
dynamic nature of the Dealscan database can be seen in the way borrowers repeatedly
access the market, and often establish relationships with the same lead arrangers. For ex-
ample, the average borrower has taken out four loans previously, and 65% of the sample
has at least one lead arranger that was also the lead arranger on a previous loan taken by
6As noted by Carey and Nini (2007), it is not straightforward to analyze deals because loans do not always
have the same set of lenders. There can also be differences in loan purpose and more importantly in loan type.
A representative deal often combines a line of credit and a term loan, and these have different implications
for riskiness, such as liquidity risk, as well as for the necessary monitoring effort (see Section 5).
7Because a number of variables such as previous relationships and previous lender exposures are con-
structed using loan information over the previous three years, it makes sense to begin the sample in 1990.
This allows information on loans from the beginning of the Dealscan data set in 1987 to be captured. 2006
serves as a natural end of the sample, both because it is before the 2007-2009 ￿nancial crisis, and because it
allows a suf￿cient window to observe borrower performance in the years following the loan syndication.
7the borrower. It is also true that lead arrangers repeatedly interact with a certain group of
participant lenders.
The main dependent variable in the study is an indicator recording defaults by issuer,
obtained from Moody’s Default Risk Service Database (2008 extract).8 Moody’s issuer
identi￿ers were cross-checked and hand-matched to Compustat. This led to 894 identi￿-
able unique borrower defaults of the 1200 U.S. issuers recording a default; 630 matched
to syndicated borrowers in Dealscan associated with about 6000 loans. The Moody’s de-
fault database was also used to calculate measures of industry default probabilities based
on outstanding bonds in a 2-digit industry transitioning into default status.
The remaining controls are borrower and lender characteristics. Most of the borrower
characteristics are obtained from Compustat and CRSP, such as pro￿tability, size, leverage,
and equity volatility.9 Lenders were ￿rst assigned a ￿nancial institution identi￿er and
then aggregated to the parent company, following Su￿ (2007) and others. In the event of
mergers & acquisitions, the target ￿nancial institution was aggregated to its acquirer at the
mergercompletionquarterlydate.10 Theacquiring￿rmalsoinheritstherelationshipsofthe
target ￿nancial ￿rm once a merger is completed. This ensures that previous relationships
are accounted for (both between the borrower and the lead arranger, and between the lead
and otherparticipantlenders). The lendermatching exerciseultimately ledto roughly3000
unique parent company lenders (whether lead arranger or participant lender) over the full
1987-2008 sample. Considerably fewer served as lead arrangers; these turn out to be 1055
lenders. The top 100 lead arrangers represent most deals; in my sample they are on 93%
of loans, similar to Su￿ (2007) and others. Finally, data from balance sheet and income
statements were included for the subset (a majority) of lead arrangers that can be matched
to U.S. bank holding companies.
8As noted in the Moody’s documentation, these are not just bankruptcies but include strategic defaults
on some securities like bonds (e.g., in a distressed exchange, or missed interest payments, but these are not
￿technical defaults￿ on account of covenant violations). Empirically, roughly 75% of issuers defaulting on
bonds also default on other debt including loans.
9Dealscan data was matched to Compustat company identi￿ers and was carefully manually checked.
I also bene￿ted from the Dealscan-Compustat link data kindly provided by Michael Roberts (Chava and
Roberts, 2008).
10Using Dealscan information on the lender’s (and lender parent’s) name, country, state, and type, ￿n-
ancial institutions were identi￿ed using: Federal Reserve ￿lings (FR Y-9C and Call Reports), the FFIEC’s
National Information Center, Federal Reserve Bank of New York pro forma holding company data set, SNL
Financial, and Dow Jones Factiva. SNL Financial served as the main source of information about mergers
& acquisitions between ￿nancial institutions in the U.S. Victoria Ivashina and Amir Su￿ also kindly sent me
their merger information, and this was used as a supplement and cross-check. The merger information used
in my study is available upon request.
84 Method
This section describes the empirical method, which is to ￿rst test whether a borrower’s
outcome is improved when its lead arranger had retained a larger share of the syndicated
loan. Second, and if so, is the information asymmetry at the point of syndication when
the lead may have an informational advantage over other syndicate participants, or is it
developing over time if the contract induces the lead arranger to monitor the borrower and
affect decisions by enforcing covenants and making ￿exible re￿nancing decisions? That
is, is the estimated effect due to a signal by an informed lead arranger to participants or is
the effect due to greater effort by a lead in its role as a delegated monitor?
While simple in theory, the empirical implementation must overcome several potential
problems. First, there is the possibility of reverse causality if a borrower that performs
well in the future was publicly anticipated to do so by all lenders. In this case, the lead
arranger may passively have chosen to hold a larger portion of such high quality loans. In
this case, the lead arranger has no informational advantage over participant lenders when
the loan is closed, and thus there is no adverse selection problem. Moreover, it would be
wrong in this case to attribute an unconditionally estimated relationship to hidden action
by the lead, as there is no moral hazard problem either. A second result that would also
not be particularly interesting would be if the estimated correlation went in the opposite
direction. That is, lead arrangers hold a greater portion of low quality loans because
they are forced to do so by participants concerned about shirking, and these loans perform
poorly. In this case, any possible asymmetric information effect would be washed over by
such a correlation. This issue is a concern because, this is precisely what other studies have
found; lead arrangers hold a larger share of the loans of riskier and more opaque borrowers
(Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Jones et al, 2005; Su￿, 2007).11
To overcome the two confounding problems described, I apply a two-pronged empirical
research design. First, I control for a wide range of loan, borrower, and lender covariates,
which should collectively minimize endogeneity problems. Arguably, however, there can
be some known risk characteristics that are observable to participants but that are not con-
trolled for in the empirical speci￿cation because they are not observed by the researcher.
The resulting endogeneity would be re￿ected in the coef￿cient on the lead arranger’s share.
11These￿ndingsarealsoconsistentwiththetheoryproposedbyGreenbaumandThakor(1987)thathigher-
quality assets will be securitized while lower quality assets that are sensitive to asymmetric information will
be funded with deposits. Likewise, if the lead arranger were to hold little or none of a loan to a borrower
requiring intensive monitoring, then participant lenders correctly expect such shirking by the lead arranger
and would seek to reduce their holdings (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
9To address this concern, the second part of the strategy is to instrument the lead’s share with
variables affecting the lead’s demand decision but that are not correlated with the extent of
adverse selection or moral hazard in the syndicate.
Therefore the baseline speci￿cation ￿ before distinguishing the source of information
asymmetry ￿ that I estimate is:
Defaultijt = ￿ + ￿(Lead Arranger Sharei) + ￿Xi + ￿Yj +
2006 X
s=1990
Zs + ￿ijt; (1)
where the coef￿cient of interest is ￿, which is expected to be negative under the null
of asymmetric information: the greater the lead’s share on loan i to borrower j at time of
syndication s, the less likely that the borrower will subsequently default. I control for a
wide range of loan (contract and syndicate) characteristics, Xi; for borrower characteristics
at the time of syndication (including the borrower’s industry characteristics), Yj; and for
syndication year dummies, Zs. I also control for lead bank characteristics in an extension
for the sample of loans arranged by U.S. banks. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust, where the individual loan error terms are allowed to be correlated for all loans of
the same borrower. I estimate equation (1) using ordinary least squares and linear IV.
The main set of instruments that I use are measures of the lead arranger’s lending limits.
There are regulatory constraints on how concentrated a bank’s exposure can be to any
one borrower. Banks also have internal lending limits, and often these bind before the
regulatory restriction is breached. There can be considerable cross-sectional variation in
lending limits across banks, which are expected to in￿uence its demand decision. As these
internal limits are not observed, I follow Ivashina (2009) in backing these out from the
lead’s previous syndicated loans. I use the 75th percentile dollar size of the lead arranger’s
share on its loans in the previous three years in the Dealscan syndicated sample. The 75th
percentile is merely meant to measure an upper threshold for the lender’s risk tolerance, and
the instrument is also time-varying. I also construct a closely related instrument, which is
the lending limit on loans where the lead arranger previously served as a participant lender,
and was not a lead arranger. As expected, these limits are smaller in magnitude but I also
expect these to be positively correlated with the lead arranger’s share on a loan.12
12Ivashina (2009) also used an instrument meant to capture the loan’s contribution to the idiosyncratic
credit risk of the lead’s loan portfolio, where the portfolio is made up of the lead’s previous loans to various
industry sectors. Reasoning that the lead arranger wishes to hold a more diversi￿ed portfolio, loans that
cause the default variance of the lead’s portfolio to go up, are expected to reduce the lead’s demand, all else
￿xed. I did not ￿nd this instrument to be signi￿cantly correlated with the lead’s share, and the correlation
10Lending limits can also be inferred from the lead’s exposure in another market, that
for mortgage securitizations and sales. Insofar as lending limits and credit risk exposure
are determined by the internal organization of the lender, then its exposure to mortgage
securitizations should be highly correlated with its retained share of a syndicated loan but
not correlated with the error term of a syndicated borrower’s performance. I construct this
instrument for the subset of loans whose lead arranger is a U.S. bank, as this information
is reported in the regulatory ￿lings of the bank holding company.13 The limitations with
this instrument are that it is only available for loans with U.S. bank lead arrangers, and that
it has been only reported since 2001. Therefore, I test the validity of this instrument in an
extension to the baseline results when focusing on characteristics of the lead bank.
The key contribution of this study is to distinguish the source of information asymmetry
in the syndicated loan market. Methodologically, this entails singling out measures that
are expected to facilitate monitoring. The dynamic nature of the Dealscan data is exploited
as borrowers return to the syndicated loan market, often with the same lead arranger. As a
result, I expect a greater sensitivity between re￿nancing decisions and future performance
when the lead arranger was induced by a previous contract to monitor. In practice, this can
be when the lead arranger was a previous lead; and conditional on that, when it previously
held on to a larger stake. Borrowers are better able to access the liquidity they need when
they run into dif￿culties and are with an informed bank, but in return for rights over surplus
(e.g., Rajan, 1992). This access to backstop liquidity is also expected to be most valuable
for borrowers in episodes of market stress. I also explore the role of loan covenants and
whether they serve as a mechanism to get the lead arranger to monitor (Rajan and Winton,
1995). There are a number of competing views on what purpose covenants serve that I will
take up in greater detail in Section 6.1.
was against the diversi￿cation prior. I constructed industry default correlations using Moody’s Default Risk
Service database and they largely match those reported by De Servigny and Renault of S&P (2003), cited
in Ivashina (2009). To make sure that this was not a methodological issue, I also constructed a simpler
instrument, which is the share of loans originated by the lead in the borrower’s 2-digit SIC industry, and
also found this instrument to be positively correlated with the lead’s retained share. These results are not
necessarily puzzling, however, because there is a countervailing motive: Financial intermediaries invest in
sector-speci￿c expertise to gain ￿local￿ advantages. For example, Winton (1999) shows that the adverse
effect from greater downside risk when a bank diversi￿es into unfamiliar sectors can offset the potential
bene￿ts of diversi￿cation.
13Schedule HC-S of regulatory form Y-9C reports the maximum amount of credit exposure arising from
recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements provided to securitizations and assets sold. From this,
I create a bank’s credit exposure to one-to-four family residential loans sold and securitized.
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fault
5.1 Results Overview
In the baseline results presented in Table 2, I examine the relationship between the share
retained by the lead arranger and the likelihood that the borrower subsequently defaults.
In addition to the variable of interest, I control for standard covariates in all regressions:
loan contract characteristics, borrower characteristics, and syndicate group characteristics.
Not reported in Table 2, but also controlled for, are industry and year dummies. The
￿rst column shows the results of ordinary least squares. While the coef￿cient on the lead’s
shareisnegative, ithasasmalleffectanditisnotstatisticallysigni￿cant. Thisissuggestive
evidence that any asymmetric information effect (should it be present) or a spurious link
between observably superior quality and a higher lead share are offset by leads retaining a
greater fraction of loans extended to weak borrowers that are prone to fail.
The next two columns of Table 2 show the results of the instrumental variables regres-
sion that identi￿es the conditional effect. Tests of the endogenous regressor reveal that the
null of exogeneity can be rejected, and the lead share should therefore be treated as endo-
genous. The ￿rst stage results are in column (2) followed by the results of the IV strategy
in column (3). I instrument for the lead arranger share using two instruments discussed
in the previous section: lending limits measured over loans on which the lead previously
served as a lead arranger and over loans on which it previously served as a participant
lender, respectively. The IV-estimated coef￿cient on the lead arranger’s share of the loan
is negative, larger in magnitude and statistically signi￿cant, supporting asymmetric inform-
ation in the syndicate. The estimated coef￿cient is equal to -0.0018 (0.0008 standard error)
and implies that a one standard deviation increase in the lead arranger’s share yields a 4.5
percent fall in the probability of default.
Various tests of the instruments con￿rm that they are valid instruments. The lending
limit measures enter positively and are jointly signi￿cant in explaining the lead’s retained
share, consistent with their economic interpretation and Ivashina’s (2009) ￿ndings. The
variables also meet the conditions for suitable instruments: they should neither be weak
instruments nor be correlated with the error term. First, they are well correlated with the
endogenous variable; the F-statistic for the joint signi￿cance of the coef￿cients on the two
instruments is equal to 70.3, well above the value of ten, which has become a benchmark
for whether weak instruments can cause a bias problem in the second stage estimates (see
12for example, Stock and Yogo, 2005). Second, the instruments are exogenous. Because
there is more than one instrument, I can test overidentifying restrictions. The p-values on
the test statistics range from 0.20 to 0.30, consistent with the null that the instruments and
the model are correctly speci￿ed.
The remaining variables in the ￿rst stage regression are correlated with the lead ar-
ranger’s share in many ways previously documented in the syndicate structure literature
(e.g. Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Su￿, 2007; Cai, 2009) and Ivashina’s ￿rst stage res-
ults. Therefore, this discussion will be very brief. For example, the lead retains a smaller
share of the loan when the loan amount and maturity are higher and the loan is secured.
Leads also hold a smaller share of loans that are revolving credit lines compared with term
loans; probably because credit lines expose the lender to greater liquidity risk (Gatev and
Strahan, 2009). Loans with ￿nancial covenants also appear to be associated with the lead
holding a smaller exposure. I take up this issue in Section 6.1 in order to better understand
the role of covenants, beyond this correlation. If the lead arranger previously served as a
lead, then it holds less (controlling for the number of loans previously syndicated by the
borrower; these also enter negatively). Higher reputational measures are also associated
with a lower retained share, and these range from the lead’s market share, to repeat inter-
actions and reciprocity between the lead arranger and participants, to when the syndicate
lead is a commercial bank.
Returning to the second stage results, most controls enter with the expected sign. Bor-
rowers that are ex ante riskier validate expectations at origination and experience more
defaults (e.g., loans with higher interest rate spreads, low rated and unrated borrowers,
less pro￿table and leveraged companies). Borrowers in industries that later experience
higher default rates also default more. Two reputational factors stand out as helping to
mitigate defaults: lead arrangers as commercial banks and when the interaction between
the lead arranger and a participant lender is a reciprocal one. The latter ￿nding supports
Cai (2009). Recent stylized facts support the former; for example the Shared National
Credit review found that a disproportionate share of problem syndicated loans are held by
nonbanks (and this is consistent both with the lower reputations of these institutions, as
well as with their inferior in-house credit assessment and monitoring capacities; Dennis
and Mullineaux, 2000; S&P, 2006).
5.1.1 Robustness Checks
The upshot is that retention of credit risk by the lead arranger has a causal and material
impact in reducing the borrower’s subsequent default. This estimated effect withstands
13a multivariate speci￿cation with an extensive set of controls. Robustness checks with
additional loan and borrower covariates are shown in Table A.1. Results of a number
of other robustness checks are not reported in the interest of space, but are also brie￿y
discussed below and are available upon request.
Thesensitivityofdefaulttotheleadarranger’sshareisrobusttoadditionalloanandbor-
rower covariates. Some of these controls are expected to help reduce the level of inform-
ation asymmetry, such as whether there are other signi￿cant stakeholders in the borrower,
and whether there are resale constraints on the loan. However, these alleviating factors
do not fully eliminate agency problems and the coef￿cient on the lead share is largely un-
changed. Loans that have a guarantor (that promises to assume the borrower’s debt in the
event of default) or a sponsor (a private equity sponsor that typically invests in companies
with leveraged capital structures) are associated with a lower lead share, and with a sig-
ni￿cantly lower likelihood of default in the case of guaranteed loans. In a similar way,
resale constraints, in particular those requiring the consent of the agent (lead arranger) and
those on the minimum amount that can be sold, are associated with more diffuse lending
syndicates. With respect to borrower outcome, agent consent, though negative, is not stat-
istically signi￿cant. However, minimum resale amounts are signi￿cant at the 10% level,
indicating a possible bene￿t from ensuring that fewer lenders hold the loan in the presence
of a secondary market.14
The result is also robust to controlling for the business cycle as proxied by year-on-year
real GDP growth in the quarter of syndication. One concern may be that loans originated
during downturns are to good quality borrowers that are less likely to default, and lead
arrangers also retain more of a loan during downturns. Lead arrangers may retain more
in downturns to satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint if monitoring costs go up; or
to close the syndication if the willingness to lend by participant lenders is reduced, all else
￿xed (e.g. Rajan, 1994).15 I ￿nd evidence in support of the lead retaining more in times
14One possible concern about inference from this and other studies that use information on how the syndic-
ated loan is structured at origination is that such information may be immaterial in the presence of a second-
ary loan market. Several pieces of evidence, however, con￿rm the relevance of using information from this
primary market. For example, Ivashina (2009) reports that less than 5% of loans originated between 2000
and 2004 were quoted in the secondary market, and an even smaller share was quoted in earlier years. Loans
that are sold are more likely to be institutional term loans compared with credit lines (Drucker and Puri,
2009). Most loans are sold by participant nonbank lenders to similar nonbanks, while the lead arrangers
are found to retain their shares following origination (Ivashina and Sun, 2010). Anecdotal evidence also
indicates that lead arrangers do not sell their loans to avoid damaging their relationship with the borrower and
other syndicate members (Esty and Megginson, 2003).
15Stylized evidence from the recent ￿nancial crisis shows that lead arrangers appreciably increased their
share of syndicated loans. For example, the average lead share jumped from one-third in the period before
the ￿nancial crisis to 45% for the period from 2007Q3 to 2008Q4. This stronger effect is also re￿ected in a
14of weak activity, but it is not responsible for the effect of the lead arranger share, which
remains virtually unchanged.
A battery of other tests were run. The central result is robust to controlling for other
measures of a borrower’s riskiness and opacity, including the borrower’s Altman z-score
￿ a more wide-ranging measure of a borrower’s creditworthiness than pro￿tability ￿ and
equity volatility, bid-ask spread, and illiquidity. Moreover, and as predicted by the theory,
asymmetric information problems (both adverse selection and moral hazard) should be
more acute when the borrower is opaque. The results in Table A.2. collectively support
this. The lead retaining a greater portion of the loan is critical for these borrowers, such as
borrowers with leveraged loans, higher equity volatility, and borrowers that are in relatively
less familiar industries (the latter is proxied by the fraction of public ￿rms that are in the
borrower’s 2-digit SIC industry at the time of syndication). Note that the borrowers in this
study are public, and therefore the lead arranger’s interest would be expected to be more
valuable for companies that are privately held.16
Changes in model speci￿cation and estimation produce consistent results. Instrumental
variable results are comparable when the lead share is replaced with the log of the lead’s
dollar amount exposure. Results of probit IV are also similar to the linear IV estimates
reported.17 Resultsarealsosimilarwhenthemodelisestimatedonthesampleofborrowers
deemed by Dealscan to be rated at the close of the loan. I also ￿nd that the sensitivity of
outcome to lead share is greater on loans that are credit lines (revolver loans) than it is on
term loans that are funded at origination. This ￿nding hints that the source of asymmetric
information lies in moral hazard in monitoring and not private information at the time of
loan origination. Credit lines require more intensive monitoring because a borrower’s
greater and signi￿cant coef￿cient on GDP growth in the ￿rst stage regression shown in Table A.1. when it is
extended to 2008. These results echo recent ￿ndings by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).
16In other robustness checks shown in Table A.3., I look at alternative performance measures that are less
extreme indicators of a borrower’s condition than actual default, but should also be related to a borrower’s
creditworthiness. These are the borrower’s pro￿tability (ROA) three years after syndication as well as its
Altmanz-scoreandequityvolatility, controllingfortherespectiveindustrymedianoutcome. Whilethelead’s
share does not appear to have a signi￿cant uniform effect on a borrower’s future pro￿tability, for example,
it is valuable for improving the pro￿tability of poorly performing and opaque borrowers. For example and
using the summary statistics in Table 1, a one standard deviation increase in the lead’s share improves the
pro￿tability of a borrower starting at the 10th ROA percentile by 0.018 more than a borrower starting at the
90th percentile.
17Probit IV can be estimated in two alternative ways; the ￿rst is maximum likelihood estimation which is
more ef￿cient and produces direct estimates of the marginal effects but has a computational drawback and
can run into problems with the iterations not converging. The alternative is the two-step estimator, which is
easier to implement. For the latter, I follow the procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, chapter 15, page
475) to derive the marginal effects from the estimated parameters. The marginal effect from the lead’s share
is found to equal -0.0016 (MLE IV probit) and -0.0011 (two-step IV probit).
15decision to draw down the line depends on how its performance evolves (Drucker and Puri,
2009; Su￿, 2009). Section 6 will evaluate a number of other tests to help tease out the
source of information asymmetry.
5.2 Lead Bank Characteristics and Subsequent Borrower Default
Before turning to core tests of moral hazard, this section takes a look at whether the attrib-
utes of the lead arranger shape the syndicate and in￿uence the borrower’s outcome. The
motivating theory ￿ underexplored in the extant empirical literature that has largely focused
on borrower drivers ￿ is the opportunity cost view. In this view, the opportunity cost of
holding a loan in a lender’s portfolio compared with off-loading it will depend on the al-
ternative opportunities available to the lender. For example Gorton and Pennacchi (1995)
show that a lender will sell a greater share of the loan in order to alleviate its capital con-
straints and when it has a higher cost of internal funds. A similar idea occurs in Parlour and
Plantin (2008), where a pooling equilibrium is more likely to be sustained in the presence
of adverse selection (and therefore the loan market will be liquid) when lenders are likely
to be hit by capital and liquidity shocks.
Empirically, I approximate the opportunity cost of retaining the loan by the lender’s
capital constraint, by how likely it is to experience liquidity shocks (that is, if it holds a
low share of liquid assets or if it has extended a lot of unused commitments that could be
drawn down unexpectedly), and by its funding interest rate (deposit and wholesale) relative
to its lending rate. Lastly, a bank’s size and pro￿tability are controlled for as measures of
a bank’s reputation.
Table 3 presents the ￿ndings for the largest subset of loans, those whose lead arranger
is a U.S. commercial bank (recall that these characteristics are taken from the regulatory
￿lings of domestically chartered bank holding companies, as outlined in Section 4). The
results of the ￿rst stage regression in column (1) of Table 3 are mostly in line with the-
oretical priors. I ￿nd that capital-constrained banks are more likely to syndicate more of
the loan (consistent with the ￿ndings of Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000, and Jones et al,
2005). Likewise, a bank with a high internal cost of funds as measured by its deposit rate
(relative to its loan rate) is also found to retain a smaller share of the loan.18 However, a
bank’s wholesale funding cost is not associated with it holding a smaller share of the loan.
This may be because of an offsetting reputational effect: a bank facing funding problems,
18Similar results are found when using instead a bank’s deposits to total asset ratio. Banks that rely more
on deposits also retain more of a loan. To the extent that deposit funding is overall a cheaper source of funds
than other liabilities and equity issuance, then these banks can afford to hold more loans in portfolio.
16due to reputational concerns, is also forced by participant lenders to retain a larger share
of the loan. There also does not appear to be support for liquidity-related opportunity
cost motives: banks more susceptible to liquidity shocks hold more of the loan and not the
opposite, possibly also because of reputational effects.
While the bank characteristics shape the syndicate structure, they mostly have no direct
in￿uence on the borrower’s outcome, at least conditional on this subset of bank lenders and
controlling for the other covariates (column (2) of Table 3). This hints that information
asymmetry is not present at the close of the loan but develops over time from monitoring.
Forexample, adverseselectionimpliesthatacapital-constrainedbankwouldbemorelikely
to sell a higher quality loan than a bank that is not capital-constrained, and this should later
show up in the second stage regression results. In contrast, moral hazard implies that a
capital-constrained bank should be associated with a worse borrower outcome, but only
indirectly through its effect on the lead retaining a smaller portion of the loan.19
The ￿nal two columns of Table 3 show the results of a complementary IV estimation
approach, where I instrument the lead arranger share with the two lending limit instru-
ments plus a new instrument, which is the lead bank’s credit risk exposure in the mortgage
securitization and sales market (only available from 2001; see Section 4). The sign on
this instrument’s coef￿cient is consistent with its economic motivation. Banks that retain
a greater credit exposure to mortgage loans originated and securitized also retain a greater
share on syndicated loans. The effect is not statistically signi￿cant in the presence of the
other lead bank controls, although the latter are also not precisely estimated in this reduced
sample of loans.
6 Dynamic Tests of Moral Hazard in Monitoring
The core interest of this study is to uncover the empirically relevant source of information
asymmetry, which has gone, by and large, unaddressed in the previous literature. There
is little concrete evidence, even for credit markets more generally, because identifying the
source of information asymmetry is not easy. One novel study runs a ￿eld experiment
in a South African consumer credit setting to separate hidden information effects due to
selection from hidden action effects due to moral hazard in effort that are induced by the
contract terms (Karlan and Zinman, 2009). They ￿nd strong evidence in support of moral
19Theonlyvariablethatissigni￿cantlyassociatedwithsubsequentborrowerdefaultisthebank’swholesale
interest rate. This indicates that the wholesale market is sensitive to the bank’s (expected) riskiness when the
market offers costly wholesale funding to such banks.
17hazard, and speci￿cally via a dynamic incentive. Analogously, this paper isolates measures
that are expected to be especially valuable from a monitoring interpretation.
A number of dynamic tests should help identify at what point in the syndication process
information asymmetry is more likely to be present. Adverse selection ￿ characterized by
an informational advantage of the lead arranger over syndicate participants ￿ would exist
when the loan is closed and is a static problem. In contrast, moral hazard in monitoring
means that the lead arranger makes an active contribution to the borrower’s performance
when it is suf￿ciently induced to monitor the project. This will be especially true as the
leadmonitorstheborroweroverthedurationoftheloanandtakesactivedecisionstoreduce
the private bene￿ts enjoyed by borrower. At the same time, as the lead learns about the
borrower, the lead becomes in a better position to make informed and ￿exible re￿nancing
decisions when the borrower is in need of liquidity. If the lead arranger is monitoring well,
it should be able to prevent the early liquidation of a borrower’s viable projects.20
There are two dimensions to the ￿rst set of dynamic tests, and these are informed by
previous relationships between the lead arranger and the borrower. First, I expect that loans
where the lead arranger was a previous lead should exhibit a greater sensitivity between the
lead’s share and borrower outcome than loans where the lead was not a previous lead.
Second, and conditional on re￿nancing with the same lead, a larger previous lead share
should contribute a greater information content about the borrower’s future performance.
The results of these two tests are presented in the ￿rst three columns of Table 4. They
back the moral hazard view. First, performance is more sensitive to the lead share when the
lead was in a previous lead relationship with the borrower (-0.0020 standard error 0.0009,
compared with -0.0002 standard error 0.0017 in the case of a new lead arranger). Second,
the result in column (3) shows that within the subset of loans having a previous lead re-
lationship, a higher previous share is associated with signi￿cantly fewer defaults (-0.0055
standard error 0.0021).
A third test is whether informed lenders offer a ￿exible source of re￿nancing during
times of market stress when borrowers need it most. Banks are expected to be valuable
liquidity backstops when market liquidity dries up. Banks bene￿t from deposit in￿ows
when market liquidity is squeezed, and these in￿ows have been shown to enable them
to naturally hedge loan demand shocks (Gatev and Strahan, 2006). Gatev and Strahan
approximate market liquidity shocks with the commercial paper spread for highly rated
20The theoryon thebene￿ts of bank(inside) debtposits that borrowers are betterable to access the liquidity
they need when they run into dif￿culties and are in an informed bank relationship (although this ￿exibility
comes at the cost of control rights; e.g., Rajan, 1992).
18non￿nancial borrowers. The relationship between the share retained by the lead and sub-
sequent performance is tighter in periods of high commercial paper spreads than in periods
of low spreads (columns (4) and (5) of Table 4). This relationship is greater and statist-
ically signi￿cant when market liquidity is tight and the lead arranger was also a previous
lead, as shown in the last two columns (the effect is -0.0033 standard error 0.0018).
These results ￿ together with scattered evidence in the previous section ￿ begin to build
a case for the moral hazard view. There were three pieces of evidence discussed in Section
5 that were also compatible with the monitoring interpretation. First, the share retained by
the lead was more important for credit lines than for term loans. Credit lines are expec-
ted to require more intensive monitoring (Drucker and Puri, 2009; Su￿, 2009). Second,
banks with a high opportunity cost of holding loans in portfolio (such as capital-constrained
banks) were not found to syndicate good loans (nor bad loans, for that matter). But capital-
constrained banks did hold a smaller share of a loan, and the latter channel had an indirect
effect on the borrower’s outcome. Third, lead arrangers were found to keep a smaller por-
tion of the loan when they had been previously engaged as lead arrangers by the borrower.
In contrast, they would be expected to retain a larger share under the alternative selection
and signaling view.21
6.1 Covenants
If the lead arranger takes actions to in￿uence the borrower’s outcome, as the results in-
dicate, there is little evidence on how it does so. Loan covenants (terms and conditions
in the loan contract) may be a means by which the lead exerts in￿uence. Covenants are
plausible candidates because they are designed to mitigate agency problems at some point
in the future.
There are a number of competing views on the function of covenants and these are well
articulated in a review by Gorton and Winton (2003). These views are not, however, mu-
tually exclusive because different covenants can serve different complementary functions.
In the traditional view (Smith and Warner, 1979), covenants protect debtholders by limiting
risk-shifting behavior by the borrower (such as asset-substitution by shareholders) and by
curbing managerial rent-seeking (such as shirking by the management and investment in
private bene￿t ventures).
21This last point was also raised by Su￿ (2007). He reasoned that if information asymmetry is because of
moral hazard in monitoring, then a lead that was previously involved with a borrower can form more diffuse
syndicates because it monitored the ￿rm and in doing so, learnt about it. If, on the other hand, information
asymmetry is because of private information that the lead has but the participant lenders lack, then the lead
arranger would be forced by participants to retain more on future loans.
19The modern view sees covenants in a more dynamic way. Lenders take actions. Cov-
enants are a mechanism through which an informed lender can in￿uence the borrower’s
business decisions and ￿nancial structure by threatening default and renegotiating. Within
this view, covenants provide an incentive to the delegated monitor to regularly collect and
process information about the borrower. In this way, they serve as ￿tripwires￿ (Rajan and
Winton, 1995).22 This makes a loan’s effective maturity contingent on monitoring by the
lender. Without monitoring the borrower’s condition based on information only available
to the public at a cost, the bank would not be able to take action to show that the covenant
has been violated. Rajan and Winton support this view with legal evidence. Courts do not
support a lender’s claim to enforce a covenant if previous inaction implicitly meant that the
covenant had been waived.
The third view ￿ nested within this modern view ￿ is that covenants de￿ne how con-
trol rights are allocated after a covenant has been violated (known as a technical default)
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Both modern interpretations are about the lender taking action
but the key operative distinction is in the timing: whether the lender gets control rights ex
post or whether the lender’s power to in￿uence the borrower is dependent on it monitoring
and gathering information in the ￿rst place.
There is existing empirical support for all three interpretations.23 For example, coven-
ant protection has been shown to be increasing in the borrower’s growth opportunities and
leverage, which are more likely to be associated with risk-shifting behavior by sharehold-
ers (Billett et al, 2007). Loans with more stringent covenants result in a higher recovery
rate (upon default) for the lender, also consistent with covenants allaying value reduction
activities by shareholders (Zhang, 2010). A number of papers analyze state-contingent
transfer of control rights to creditors (e.g., Chava and Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Su￿,
2009). The former study ￿nds that a borrower’s investment is reduced following a cov-
enant violation. Besides the anecdotal evidence, Su￿ (2009) provides evidence of active
monitoring to maintain ￿nancing, which is closest to Rajan and Winton (1995). Using
repeated SEC ￿lings on ￿rms’ credit lines and drawn amounts, he shows that lines of credit
22For example, S&P (2006) discuss the exchange of con￿dential information that goes on after the credit
agreement has been signed. These include ￿nancial disclosures at frequent intervals, covenant compliance
information, waiver requests, and ￿nancial projections and plans.
23Moreover, different covenants can serve different purposes. Falling under the traditional view are restric-
tions on dividend payments, on new debt issuance, on changes in business focus, and on ￿sweeps￿ covenants
that ensure that proceeds from asset sales go to the reduction of debt. Alternatively and consistent with
the modern view, ￿nancial covenants such as net worth and interest coverage, make sure that the borrower
stays ￿nancially sound (or likewise determine the conditions under which control rights are transferred to the
debtholders).
20are not fully committed liquidity insurance, but are contingent on the borrower maintaining
a healthy cash ￿ow condition ￿ as laid out in the cash ￿ow based ￿nancial covenants.
6.1.1 Tests of Covenants as Monitoring Mechanisms
To the extent that covenants incentivize the lead arranger to monitor, I expect a tighter
relationship with outcomes in loans with more covenant restrictions. The results in Table
5, provide overall support for this hypothesis. Panel A shows results for a covenant split
according to contemporaneous covenant characteristics, while Panel B shows results for a
covenant split according to the covenants on a borrower’s previous loans. The latter test is
closer to the dynamic view of covenants.
Jointly, the ￿ndings support moral hazard in monitoring.24 The results show that there
is a tighter negative relationship between the lead’s share and subsequent default on loans
with a ￿nancial covenant compared with loans that have no ￿nancial covenants (the coef-
￿cient is equal to -0.0020 standard error 0.0009, compared with -0.0009 standard error
0.0016 on loans with no ￿nancial covenants). A similar statistically signi￿cant relation-
ship is found for borrowers whose previous loans had ￿nancial covenants. Similar results
also hold when running a comparison according to the number of covenants (these and the
slack measure are calculated in the same way as Drucker and Puri, 2009; see the appendix).
A third measure of covenant constraints can be approximated by how much slack a bor-
rower has on a given covenant. For example, net worth covenant slack is measured as
the difference between the borrower’s actual net worth and the minimum level de￿ned in
the covenant and normalized by the borrower’s assets. The evidence is somewhat mixed
for this measure. The impact of the lead’s share is greater for borrowers with a previ-
ously tight net worth covenant than for those with a previously loose net worth covenant
(Panel B). But the contemporaneous results do not support the null: the magnitude of the
coef￿cient is slightly larger and statistically signi￿cant on loans with more slack.
If loan covenants help to induce the lead arranger to continuously monitor the borrower,
as the results indicate, it is important to understand how loan covenants are set in the con-
tract. The degree of covenant rigor will be endogenously chosen along with other loan
terms, and in particular, the lead arranger’s retained share of the loan. The null hypothesis
consistent with Rajan and Winton (1995) is that covenants are set in the contract precisely
24The lead’s exposure may also in￿uence how seriously creditor control rights are put into action after a
covenant violation. For example, Chava and Roberts (2008) ￿nd that covenant violations in loans with a
single lender lead to a much larger investment decline compared with violations in loans with more diffuse
syndicates. This ￿nding is consistent with the lead arranger having more of an incentive to restructure (and
therefore signi￿cantly alter investment behavior) when it retains more of the loan.
21to induce the delegated monitor to monitor because it will have less incentive to do so when
there are other claimants on the borrower. On the other hand, covenants could substitute
for delegated monitoring. That is, they could serve as a ￿public monitoring device￿, as ar-
ticulated by Drucker and Puri (2009). In their view, loans with greater covenant restrictions
facilitate loan sales. Dispersed investors can use them as a benchmark against which to
compare the borrower’s performance. As a result, covenants protect uninformed investors,
thus helping to maintain a liquid secondary loan market. To distinguish between these two
views on who is the relevant monitor, I take advantage of the IV strategy to estimate the
relationship between covenants and the lead’s share.
Loan covenants also depend on the business cycle and are characterized by common
trends, such as the proliferation of ￿covenant-lite￿ loans in the period before the 2007-2009
￿nancial crisis. Lenders partly ceded renegotiation control by agreeing to such loans.
While these loans may require that a borrower comply with a covenant when the borrower
takes an action such as an acquisition, the borrower would not have to comply with the
covenant for quarterly maintenance purposes (S&P, 2006). The evolution of covenants
over time is traced out in Table 6. Coverage of covenants in Dealscan is limited before
the mid-1990s (Chava and Roberts, 2008). In the decade from 1996 to 2006, covenant
restrictions eased, and in particular in the last part of the sample. For example, the number
of covenants in 2006 was on average one compared with 1.8 over the sample; the slack in
the net worth covenant reached 0.13 compared with 0.09 over the sample. Unfortunately,
this sample does not cover many business cycles, but there is evidence of cyclicality in that
covenants also eased in 2000. The effect of cyclicality will be explored in more detail in
Table 7, where quarterly GDP growth is one of the covariates.25
The results of the relationship between covenant constraints and the lead arranger’s
share are shown in Table 7. These models control for the business cycle and the borrower’s
previous covenant characteristics. All the standard covariates included in Table 2 are also
controlled for. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results of ordinary least squares for the
￿nancial covenant indicator, the number of covenants, and the net worth covenant slack
measure, respectively. Columns (2), (4), and (6) repeat the analysis with IV estimation
25I do not have data on covenants from 2007, but recent evidence suggests that these have considerably
tightened with the ￿nancial crisis. For example, the 2009 Shared National Credit review documented that
underwriting standards on new loans were more stringent than on legacy loans. That covenants may be
countercyclical is compatible with Rajan (1994). In his model, rational but short-termist bank managers
partly care about their market perception. To the extent that market perception of the bank’s ability is
affected by the bank’s current earnings and the bank’s performance relative to its peers, the manager chooses
to maintain a lax credit policy and to loosen covenants as long as his peers are doing well. Banks then
coordinate on adverse shocks to tighten credit policies.
22(using the lending limit instruments).
The striking result is that the OLS relationship between covenant intensity and lead
exposure is a negative one, but the IV-estimated relationship is a positive one. That is,
covenants appear to be substitutes for delegated monitoring but the true relationship is one
where covenants go hand in hand with monitoring by the lead arranger. The OLS effect
is probably swamped by reverse causality ￿ in that tighter covenants then allow the lead to
retain a smaller share as participant lenders are persuaded to increase their exposure. The
estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the lead arranger’s share yields
a 4 percent increase in the probability that the loan has a ￿nancial covenant, compared
with a 0.6 percent decrease based on the least squares estimate. Similarly, a one standard
deviation in the lead’s share is associated with a 0.35 increase in the number of covenants
(while the OLS results suggest a 0.07 fall). A similar direction is also present when looking
at the slack in the net worth covenant (though it is not statistically signi￿cant).26
Taken together, the results shown in Tables 5 and 7 offer compelling support for the
view that covenants provide an incentive for the delegated lead arranger to monitor, closest
to Rajan and Winton (1995). It is useful to contrast these results with recent ￿ndings
by Drucker and Puri (2009). The latter study showed that loans that are sold have more
restrictive covenants, and the authors concluded that covenants substitute for delegated
monitoring. Their results are compatible with my least squares result that covenants appear
to be associated with more diffuse lending syndicates. In the absence of an instrument for
loan sales in their study, it is inconclusive. It may also be the case that while secondary
market loan sales and syndications in the primary market share common features, there
may remain signi￿cant differences. This topic deserves further investigation.27
One last set of comments concerns the relationship of covenants with the other cov-
ariates. Covenants are countercyclical (at least in their incidence and number, not in the
slack of the net worth measure): there are more restrictions during downturns as evidenced
by the negative coef￿cient on GDP growth. These ￿ndings echo those in Bradley and
Roberts (2004) and Zhang (2010), and also support Rajan (1994). I also ￿nd that covenant
26That tighter covenants are associated with a greater lead share is also true for the tangible net worth




27In practice, both Rajan and Winton’s take and Drucker and Puri’s take are compatible. Some covenants
can be publicly monitored at little or no cost, while other covenants may require more effort by a delegated
monitor to observe whether a violation has occurred. For example, Diamond (1984) conjectures that contin-
gent covenants are costly to monitor, such as determining that the borrower’s working capital not fall below
some level unless necessary for expansion of inventory.
23constraints are greater for more leveraged borrowers and for loans with a longer maturity,
compatible with the ￿ndings by Billett et al (2007) who look at bond covenants.
7 Conclusion
This study has uncovered evidence of asymmetric information in the syndicated loan mar-
ket, in a manner consistent with the related theory. An important contribution of this study
is in clarifying the blurred grouping of adverse selection and moral hazard. Both are im-
portant sources of asymmetric information. But they have different policy implications.
The syndication process itself does not affect the adverse selection problem ￿ whether the
lead has an informational advantage over syndicate participants at the close of the loan. In
contrast, moral hazard is endogenous to the process of syndication. My results indicate
that moral hazard is the greater problem, and that loan covenants are a valuable mechanism
to induce the lead arranger to monitor.
While the adverse effects of credit sharing have taken center stage in this paper, this
does not necessarily imply that credit risk sharing reduces welfare. Such markets provide
a valuable form of insurance for lenders as they free up capital and enable credit expan-
sion. The results in this paper showed that banks retain a lower portion of loans when
the opportunity cost of holding loans in portfolio is high. Moreover, there is evidence
that ￿rms whose loans are sold maintain lending relationships and have increased access
to loans (Drucker and Puri, 2009). This may also be why borrowers are willing to pay
for the intermediary’s asymmetric information problem in the form of higher loan interest
rate spreads (e.g., Ivashina, 2009). In addition, the shift from a relationship-based banking
system to arm’s length ￿nance is endogenous and has been made possible by technical,
regulatory and institutional change (Rajan, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008). While rela-
tionship lending may offer more ￿exible liquidity, it comes at the cost of hold-up problems
by informed lenders exploiting their monopoly advantage.
The tension between insurance and incentives has yet to be resolved. We may have
to wait until the dust settles from foreclosed houses to appreciate what direction ￿nancial
intermediation takes. A paper by Cerasi and Rochet (2008) speaks to the optimal design of
bank capital regulation in the presence of credit risk transfer activities. This diversi￿cation
should allow banks to decrease their value at risk, and with that their regulatory capital.
But a decrease in regulatory capital fails to consider monitoring incentives. The optimal
capital ratio should be increasing in the severity of the bank’s moral hazard problem.
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Borrower default 0.077 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.000
Instruments
Lead lending limit, as lead (US$ million) 61.775 49.520 26.668 46.000 120.750
Lead lending limit, as participant (US$ million) 46.752 28.281 22.115 39.985 91.651
Lead exposure to mortgage securitization  0.141 0.244 0.008 0.057 0.467
Contract characteristics
Lead share (%) 31.939 25.013 8.240 24.000 66.670
Number of lead arrangers 1.162 0.386 1.000 1.000 2.000
Total number of lenders 10.440 10.077 2.000 7.000 22.000
All-in-spread drawn (%) 1.541 1.175 0.325 1.250 3.000
Facility amount (US$ million) 329.655 800.596 20.000 125.000 750.000
Log(Facility amount) 18.620 1.438 16.811 18.644 20.436
Maturity (months) 43.918 24.028 12.000 41.000 72.000
Secured 0.470 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000
Secured missing 0.236 0.425 0.000 0.000 1.000
Revolver 0.799 0.401 0.000 1.000 1.000
Financial covenant 0.693 0.461 0.000 1.000 1.000
Financial ratio 0.066 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of covenants 2.971 2.573 0.000 3.000 7.000
Covenant slack net worth 0.102 0.144 -0.013 0.094 0.274
Purpose: corporate 0.416 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000
Purpose: acquisition 0.117 0.321 0.000 0.000 1.000
Purpose: refinancing 0.281 0.449 0.000 0.000 1.000
Purpose: backupline 0.148 0.355 0.000 0.000 1.000
Purpose: other 0.038 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.000
Guaranteed 0.062 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sponsored 0.072 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000
Borrower consent 0.728 0.445 0.000 1.000 1.000
Agent consent 0.740 0.439 0.000 1.000 1.000
Min assignment (US$ million) 5.001 4.663 0.000 5.000 10.000
Leveraged loan 0.534 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
Borrower characteristics
Rated 0.514 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
Rating AAA 0.006 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rating AA 0.017 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rating A  0.088 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rating BBB 0.172 0.377 0.000 0.000 1.000
Rating BB 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 1.000
Rating B 0.104 0.305 0.000 0.000 1.000
Rating CCC 0.011 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rating CC and below 0.003 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000
Opaque 0.447 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000
Profitability (ROA) 0.126 0.089 0.041 0.123 0.226
Leverage 0.356 0.225 0.075 0.333 0.658
Size ( log(assets)) 6.931 1.798 4.838 6.713 9.479
Altman z-score 3.173 1.933 1.098 2.860 5.877
Equity volatility 0.026 0.015 0.012 0.023 0.044
Equity bid-ask spread 0.754 0.669 0.245 0.616 1.364
Equity amihud illiquidity 0.763 1.079 0.103 0.386 1.818
Industry default probability 0.011 0.020 0.000 0.004 0.028
Firms in same industry 0.030 0.028 0.005 0.019 0.062
Previous loans 3.878 4.622 0.000 2.000 9.000
Syndicate group characteristics
Previous lead 0.652 0.476 0.000 1.000 1.000
Lead fraction banks 0.913 0.270 0.500 1.000 1.000
Lead country US 0.922 0.268 1.000 1.000 1.000
Lead market share 0.097 0.115 0.002 0.052 0.270
Repeat interactions lead to participant 1.632 4.187 0.054 0.914 4.038
Reciprocal 0.930 0.255 1.000 1.000 1.000
Lead bank characteristics
Size ( log(assets)) 19.203 1.181 17.691 19.340 20.773
Capital 0.074 0.013 0.059 0.074 0.091
Liquidity 0.177 0.075 0.106 0.158 0.274
Ununsed commitments 0.403 0.094 0.306 0.394 0.506
Income 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.014
Loan interest rate 0.075 0.017 0.054 0.075 0.100
Deposit interest rate 0.037 0.014 0.016 0.039 0.057
Wholesale interest rate 0.043 0.019 0.017 0.046 0.061
Aggregate characteristics
GDP growth 0.032 0.012 0.015 0.034 0.046
Commercial paper spread (%) 0.235 0.162 0.060 0.210 0.440
Note:
See Appendix A for variable definitions.
Syndicated loan facilities for US borrowers, 1990 - 2006, Sample observations = 8996Table 2. Lead Arranger Syndicate Exposure and Subsequent Borrower Default 
(1) (2) (3)









































































Observations 9160 8996 8996
R
2 0.13 0.50 0.12
Notes:
All regressions include year and industry dummies.  'Other purpose' is the omitted loan purpose type
and a AAA rating is the omitted rating dummy.
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses















Industry default probability, lead 3 
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Rating BBBTable 3. Lead Bank Characteristics and Subsequent Borrower Default 
(1) (2) (3) (4)











1.5612*** 0.0100 -0.0714 0.0103
(0.4695) (0.0068) (0.8321) (0.0110)
-4.4161*** -0.0137** -3.5836*** -0.0140**
(0.3951) (0.0067) (0.8014) (0.0061)
-1.9967*** -0.0118* -2.2822*** -0.0061
(0.3909) (0.0061) (0.6344) (0.0040)
-1.2830* 0.0069 2.3289* -0.0085
(0.7249) (0.0121) (1.3239) (0.0067)
-2.0844*** -0.0149 -8.3328*** 0.0086
(0.7505) (0.0095) (1.7246) (0.0086)
-0.5094 0.0011 -1.0492 -0.0032
(0.7836) (0.0119) (1.1766) (0.0046)
1.7671 -0.0280 1.5299 -0.0174*
(1.2356) (0.0181) (1.8802) (0.0097)
Borrower characteristics
-1.0108 -0.0662** -8.0959 -0.0294
(4.8297) (0.0322) (5.9380) (0.0288)
5.0512 0.0233 10.3441* 0.0382
(4.9106) (0.0284) (5.7712) (0.0280)
2.5514 0.0407 10.2071* 0.0399
(4.8194) (0.0288) (5.6999) (0.0279)
-1.4463 0.0668** 6.2599 0.0329
(4.8166) (0.0299) (5.7670) (0.0275)
-1.5221 0.0825** 5.3879 0.0346
(4.8430) (0.0328) (5.9079) (0.0292)
-0.2842 0.1489*** 10.5444* 0.0579
(4.9874) (0.0382) (6.2566) (0.0380)
-4.5526 0.3516*** 6.5931 0.1835*
(5.6718) (0.0807) (7.8482) (0.1023)
-5.0781 0.7596*** -0.5959 0.2324
(5.6450) (0.1173) (11.2301) (0.2346)
-5.2274 -0.0479 -5.0647 -0.0763
(3.4893) (0.0598) (6.4810) (0.0472)
-2.7834** 0.0966*** 3.1593 0.0820***
(1.4220) (0.0312) (2.5334) (0.0272)
-1.7528*** 0.0130** -1.6067*** -0.0005
(0.3384) (0.0060) (0.5715) (0.0035)
12.1134 0.0583 16.8730 0.0035
(16.2786) (0.2739) (35.2382) (0.2093)
10.3361 1.0894** 20.1861 0.5553
(20.8877) (0.4302) (32.3582) (0.3872)
-1.3799*** -0.0063 -0.0591 -0.0005
(0.5097) (0.0095) (0.7475) (0.0041)
Syndicate characteristics
-1.2390* -0.0139 -1.4570 -0.0222**
(0.6633) (0.0111) (1.3415) (0.0097)
-4.3064** -0.0723** -1.8488 -0.0232
(1.7000) (0.0290) (1.8833) (0.0200)
3.1432 -0.0228 4.7760 0.0060
(2.9507) (0.0636) (11.1958) (0.0191)
-12.6108*** 0.0338 -4.0876 0.0805*
(4.0850) (0.0560) (8.0910) (0.0419)
-2.6275*** -0.0156*** -3.324*** -0.0032
(0.2659) (0.0044) (0.7001) (0.0026)
-28.1551*** -0.0718** -32.0023*** -0.0182
(1.7479) (0.0335) (3.3117) (0.0205)
Lead bank characteristics
-1.4503*** 0.0025 -1.1478 -0.0090
(0.4514) (0.0066) (0.9053) (0.0070)
131.2453*** -0.0511 98.5284 0.1438
(31.5308) (0.6178) (80.7272) (0.5169)
-14.5211*** -0.0875 -5.5563 -0.0520
(4.6519) (0.0782) (12.4362) (0.0690)
0.6493 -0.0760 -15.2320 -0.0067
(3.7520) (0.0714) (13.8145) (0.0951)
-126.8831 -0.4877 -48.1845 -1.0764
(82.1370) (1.1904) (179.7099) (1.0242)
50.9980 -0.2141 168.5281 2.7770**
(33.7951) (0.5919) (165.1516) (1.1663)
-132.1667** 0.8450 -211.8000 -2.3736
(54.5425) (1.0889) (281.6545) (2.6276)
54.9795* 1.0773* 121.0007 1.8785*
(32.4544) (0.5778) (125.7786) (1.1311)
Observations 7354 7354 2539 2539
R
2 0.54 0.11 0.50 0.02
Notes:
All regressions include year, industry, and loan purpose dummies.  
The AAA rating is the omitted rating dummy in the regressions.
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses
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Wholesale interest rateTable 4. Dynamic Tests of Moral Hazard: Previous Lead Relationship and Subsequent Borrower Default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Conditional on previous lead = 1 Conditional on previous lead = 1
Previous 
Yes No lead share High Low High Low
-0.0020** -0.0002 -0.0055*** -0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0033* -0.0012
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0007)
Observations 5862 3134 9349 4103 4893 2550 3312
R
2 0.12 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.16
Notes:
All regressions include the covariates in baseline regression, Table 2 col (3).  The regressions in col (4) to (7) also include the non-financial commercial paper spread,
which does not enter significantly.
Low refers to below the median, while High refers to above the median of the variable of interest.  See Table 1 for summary statistics.
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Previous lead Commerical paper spread
Lead share
Commerical paper spreadTable 5. Dynamic Tests of Moral Hazard: Covenants and Subsequent Borrower Default
Panel A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes No High Low Tight Loose
-0.0020** -0.0009 -0.0024** -0.0016 -0.0027 -0.0038*
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0021)
-0.0561 0.2454
(0.1109) (0.1576)
Observations 6234 2762 3531 5465 805 797
R
2 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.27 0.18
Panel B.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes No High Low Tight Loose
-0.0019** -0.0021 -0.0030** -0.0014 -0.0041** 0.0037
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0029)
0.0465 0.0861
(0.1285) (0.1309)
Observations 4389 2855 1351 5893 681 795
R
2 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.26 0.24
Notes:
All regressions include the covariates in baseline regression, Table 2 col (3).  Also included in the regressions in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) 
are the number of covenants, and number of previous covenants.  These measures are not statistically significant.  
High and Low for the number of covenants  refer to above and below median number of covenants (3 covenants).
Tight covenant refers to below median slack, while loose covenant refers to above median slack.  See Table 1 for summary statistics.
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Number of covenants Covenant slack net worth
Lead share
Covenant slack net worth
Previous covenant slack net worth
Lead share
Financial covenant
Previous financial covenant Previous number of covenants Previous covenant slack net worthTable 6. The Evolution of Covenants on Syndicated Loans
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 Financial  covenant 0.450 0.427 0.482 0.444 0.403 0.451 0.474 0.477 0.491 0.403 0.318
Number of covenants 2.300 2.213 2.549 2.322 1.710 1.704 1.784 1.826 1.524 1.359 1.039
  Covenant slack net worth 0.087 0.086 0.065 0.079 0.089 0.067 0.073 0.115 0.112 0.146 0.128
Notes:
See Appendix A for variable definitions.  These figures are equally-weighted averages of loans syndicated in a given year. 
 The figures reported for 'financial covenant' are the fraction of loans that have financial covenants.  Table 7. The Relationship Between Covenants and Lead Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial covenant Number of covenants Covenant slack net worth
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Variables of interest
-0.00023 0.0015* -0.0026* 0.0137** 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.00019) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0060) (0.0002) (0.0011)
-2.7947 -2.7418*** -17.3356*** -17.0290*** -0.5626 -0.6572
(0.6632) (0.6710) (4.4595) (4.5393) (0.8076) (0.8602)
Previous covenant characteristics
0.0978*** 0.0976*** -0.1205 -0.1390 0.0111 0.0078
(0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0922) (0.0927) (0.0137) (0.0132)
-0.0074 -0.0065 0.0324 0.0187 0.0215 0.0201
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0965) (0.0979) (0.0147) (0.0148)
0.0046* 0.0047* 0.2898*** 0.2931*** -0.0046 -0.0041
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0234) (0.0237) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Other contract characteristics
-0.0005 -0.0017 0.1404*** 0.1472*** -0.0051 -0.0035
(0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0378) (0.0410) (0.0082) (0.0083)
-0.0022 0.0068 -0.0021 0.0854** -0.0106 -0.0130
(0.0052) (0.0068) (0.0321) (0.0425) (0.0076) (0.0101)
0.0167*** 0.0203*** 0.3321*** 0.3619*** 0.0066 0.0051
(0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0393) (0.0413) (0.0063) (0.0061)
-0.0421*** -0.0405*** 0.7272*** 0.7322*** 0.0021 -0.0005
(0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0775) (0.0799) (0.0113) (0.0112)
0.0227*** 0.0265*** -0.5548*** -0.5138*** 0.0123 0.0131
(0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0619) (0.0649) (0.0092) (0.0089)
0.0277 0.0359 0.3163* 0.3454* 0.0883* 0.0876*
(0.0287) (0.0295) (0.1896) (0.1926) (0.0487) (0.0483)
0.0832*** 0.0897*** 1.1467*** 1.1579*** 0.1046** 0.1028**
(0.0307) (0.0315) (0.2080) (0.2098) (0.0500) (0.0498)
0.0977*** 0.1038*** 0.5213*** 0.5425 0.0885* 0.0866*
(0.0290) (0.0297) (0.1937) (0.1957) (0.0489) (0.0485)
0.0310 0.0400 0.3156 0.3635* 0.1099** 0.1069**
(0.0306) (0.0315) (0.1980) (0.2011) (0.0494) (0.0492)
Borrower characteristics
0.0624 0.0608 -0.8537*** -0.8465*** 0.0448* 0.0529**
(0.1274) (0.1303) (0.2280) (0.2245) (0.0272) (0.0268)
-0.2169 -0.2188 0.2312 0.2129 -0.0987** -0.1008**
(0.1323) (0.1349) (0.2495) (0.2416) (0.0470) (0.0461)
-0.0700 -0.0682 0.4103* 0.4087** -0.0699** -0.0754***
(0.1292) (0.1321) (0.2114) (0.2072) (0.0294) (0.0291)
-0.00004 0.0048 0.8598*** 0.9044*** -0.0774*** -0.0830***
(0.1277) (0.1306) (0.2095) (0.2059) (0.0205) (0.0220)
-0.0058 -0.0009 1.2790*** 1.3218*** -0.0687*** -0.0739***
(0.1278) (0.1307) (0.2246) (0.2217) (0.0254) (0.0250)
-0.0091 -0.0125 1.3537*** 1.3240*** -0.0752*** -0.0797***
(0.1290) (0.1320) (0.2447) (0.2421) (0.0288) (0.0295)
-0.0320 -0.0236 0.6005* 0.6825** -0.0603* -0.0677*
(0.1318) (0.1349) (0.3350) (0.3419) (0.0311) (0.0383)
0.0430 0.0582 0.8702 0.9527 -0.0248 -0.0294
(0.1397) (0.1420) (0.7540) (0.7577) (0.0402) (0.0435)
0.0328 0.0502 0.3146 0.4346 0.4358*** 0.4352***
(0.0642) (0.0637) (0.3740) (0.3820) (0.0864) (0.0850)
-0.0561** -0.0510** 0.3145** 0.3543** -0.2306*** -0.2349***
(0.0238) (0.0243) (0.1565) (0.1609) (0.0352) (0.0348)
-0.0215*** -0.0182 -0.1924*** -0.1676*** 0.0306*** 0.0299***
(0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0316) (0.0339) (0.0097) (0.0096)
0.0399 0.0525 -1.5126 -1.5883 0.2486 0.2334
(0.1626) (0.1635) (1.3684) (1.3686) (0.1965) (0.1939)
-0.0107 -0.0098 0.0609 0.0680 -0.0370*** -0.0351***
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0638) (0.0644) (0.0118) (0.0121)
Syndicate characteristics
-0.0132 -0.0115 0.0167 0.0304 -0.0021 -0.0036
(0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0721) (0.0748) (0.0117) (0.0116)
-0.0150 -0.0056 0.2700** 0.3615*** 0.0082 0.0056
(0.0137) (0.0148) (0.1250) (0.1366) (0.0193) (0.0193)
-0.0001 -0.0010 0.0035 -0.0306 -0.0396** -0.0302*
(0.0147) (0.0149) (0.1353) (0.1370) (0.0192) (0.0176)
0.1470*** 0.1429*** -0.0694 -0.1318 0.0672 0.0716
(0.0432) (0.0436) (0.2489) (0.2540) (0.0539) (0.0528)
-0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0018 0.0041 -0.0008*** -0.0009*
(0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0058) (0.0102) (0.0003) (0.0005)
-0.0032 0.0407 0.2791* 0.7189*** -0.0159 -0.0179
(0.0170) (0.0322) (0.1465) (0.2459) (0.0201) (0.0337)
Observations 7951 7855 7951 7855 1438 1425
R
2 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.31 0.31
Notes:
All regressions include year and industry dummies.  'Other purpose' is the omitted loan purpose type, 
and a AAA rating is the omitted rating dummy.
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Lead market share
Repeat interactions lead to 
participant
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Log (maturity)Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variables Definition
Main Dependent variable
Borrower default Indicator of US borrower default on bonds as recorded in Moody's Default Risk Service Database, 2008 download.
Of the 894 identifiable unique borrower (gvkey) defaults, 630 were matched to syndicated borrowers in Dealscan.
Instruments
Lead lending limit, as lead Lead arranger - specific variable defined as the 75th percentile of the dollar size of the lead arranger share on its syndicated 
loan facilities calculated over the 3 years previous to the loan.  This is limited to loans on which it also served as a lead arranger.
Note that all lenders are aggregated to their parent company and inherit the characteristics of the parent, as in Sufi (2007)
Lead lending limit, as participant Lead arranger - specific variable defined as the 75th percentile of the dollar size of the lead arranger  share on its syndicated 
loan facilities calculated over the 3 years previous to the loan.   This is limited to loans on which the current lead arranger was 
only a participant on the previous loan, and not a lead arranger.
Lead exposure to mortgage securitization Lead arranger-specific variable defined as the maximum credit exposure arising from recourse or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements as a share of securitizations and assets sold relating to 1-4 family residential loans, averaged over 3 years.  
Defined from Y-9C Schedule HC-S as (bhckb712+bhckc393+bhckc400+bhckb797)/(bhckb705+bhckb790).
Contract characteristics
Lead share The share of the loan retained by the lead bank(s).  These are the lenders listed under the category "lead arranger".  In the 
 case of more than one lead arranger, the sum of the shares is taken.  This also applies to the lead lending limit instruments.
Number of lead arrangers The number of lead arrangers on a loan facility.
Total number of lenders The total number of lenders (lead arrangers, other lenders in a lead role, and lenders in a participant role) on a loan facility.
All-in-spread drawn This is the amount the borrower pays over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down.  This is reported in Table 1 in %.
Log (facility amount) Natural log of the facility (or tranche) amount in US$.  This is reported in Table 1 in US $ million.
Log (maturity) Natural log of the loan facility's tenor, which is reported in months.
Secured Dummy = 1 indicating if the loan is secured, 0 otherwise.
Secured missing Dummy = 1 indicating the secured status of a loan is missing, and 0 otherwise.  
Revolver Dummy = 1 indicating revolver (credit line) type loan facilities.  It takes on a value of 1 if the specific tranche type is equal to
"Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.", "Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.", "364-Day Facility", or "Revolver/Term Loan".
Financial covenant Dummy = 1 indicating the loan has financial covenants, and 0 otherwise.
Financial ratio Dummy = 1 indicating the loan has financial ratios, and 0 otherwise.  This is defined in Dealscan as loans that include financial 
covenants or measurements as they pertain to borrower or guarantor as a prerequisite to maintain credit availability.
Number of covenants The number of financial covenants measured as in Puri and Drucker (2009).  Specifically, this is the sum of the total number 
of financial covenants and sweep covenants (asset, equity, debt) plus one if the loan has a dividend restriction.
Covenant slack net worth This measure of slack is defined for loans on which a net worth financial covenant is specified.  Equal to 
(net worth - covenant minimum level)/book assets, where net worth is equal to total assets - total liabilities.  (CMPST: AT - LT).
Slack measure is winsorized at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Purpose: corporate Dummy = 1 if loan purpose type is corporate purposes, working capital, or capital expenditure, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose: acquisition Dummy = 1 if loan purpose type is takeover, LBO, or LBO/MBO, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose: refinancing Dummy = 1 if loan purpose type is debt repayment, or recapitalization, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose: backupline Dummy = 1 if loan purpose type is commercial paper backup, or acquisition line, and 0 otherwise.
Purpose: other Dummy = 1 if loan purpose type is other purpose.
Guaranteed Dummy = 1 indicating that the loan has a Guarantor, a company that guarantees to assume all responsibilities associated 
with debt structured on behalf of the borrower in the event of default, and 0 otherwise.
Sponsored  Dummy = 1 indicating a loan in which a Sponsor (private equity investor with an equity ownership) controls at least 20%, as 
defined in Dealscan.  These typically are loans financing private equity sponsored leveraged buyouts (LBOs).
Borrower consent Dummy = 1 indicating a resale constraint, and 0 otherwise.  Specifically, borrower consent is required for 'assignments'.  This is a 
type of resale where the assignee becomes a direct signatory to the loan and receives interest and principal payments directly 
from the administrative agent.  The other type of resale is a 'participation' which is an agreement between an existing lender 
and a new participant.  The existing lender remains officially on the loan, and therefore consent is typically not required.
Agent consent Dummy = 1 indicating agent consent is required for 'assignments'.  See borrower consent for more information.
Log (min assignment) Natural log of the assignment minimum amount in US$, and 0 otherwise.  See borrower consent for more information.
Leveraged loan Dummy = 1 indicating a 'leveraged loan', and 0 otherwise.  This is a loan priced at 125 basis oints or more above LIBOR.  
See Ivashina and Sun (2007).
Borrower characteristics
Rated Dummy = 1 indicating the borrower's senior debt was rated by S&P or Moodys at the close of the loan.  It is 0 if there is 
information indicating that the borrower is not rated, and it is missing in cases where the rating status by both S&P and Moody's
 is missing. This information is from Dealscan.
Rating AAA … Rating CC and below Dummies indicating the borrower's senior debt rating at the close of the loan, average of S&P and Moody's.  See Rated for detail.
Opaque Dummy = 1 indicating publicly traded borrowers without a debt rating, and 0 otherwise.  This information is from Compustat.
Profitability (ROA) EBITDA to total assets.  (CMPST: OIBDP/AT).  Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Leverage  Book leverage ratio.  (CMPST: (DLTT+DLC)/AT). Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Size ( log(assets)) Natural log of borrower's total assets.  (CMPST: AT).
Altman z-score Defined as Z = 1.2X(1) + 1.4X(2) + 3.3X(3) + 0.6X(4) + 1X(5), where X1 is working capital/total assets, X2 is retained earnings to 
total assets, X3 is EBIT/total assets, X4 is market value equity/book value of total liabilities, and X5 is sales/total assets.  
All X variables are winsorized at -4 and 8 (see Jiang et al, 2008). (CMPST: X1 = (ACT-LCT)/AT, X2= RE/AT, X3=OIBDP/AT, 
X4=PRCC_C*CSHO/LT, and X5=SALE/AT.)
Equity volatility This is the standard deviation of the residuals from Fama-French 3 factor model estimated with daily stock return data over the 
year prior to syndication date.  Borrower's equity return information is from CRSP, and Fama-French factors are available 
from the Kenneth French Data Library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
Equity bid-ask spread Average of daily bid-ask spread on a borrower's equity over the year prior to syndication date, using data from CRSP.
Equity amihud illiquidity Yearly average of illiquidity using daily data from CRSP.  Equal to 1000 times the square root of absolute value of return/volume.
Industry default probability This is the 2-digit industry-level default probability calculated over the previous 3 years using data on bonds transitioning into 
default from Moody's Credit Risk Default Service Database.  See De Servigny and Renault (2003).
Firms in same industry This is the fraction of firms in Compustat that are in the borrower's 2-digit SIC in the year of the loan.
Log (1+ previous loans) Tne number of previous syndicated loans by a borrower is calculated from Dealscan.  This does not double-count cases of 
serveral loan facilities on the same previous date.Appendix A: Variable Definitions, cont'd
Variables Definition
Syndicate group characteristics
Previous lead Dummy = 1 indicating that the lead arranger(s) was a lead on a previous loan by the borrower.  In the event of mergers between
 lenders, the acquiring financial firm inherits  the relationships of the target financial firm at the merger completion date.  
For example, if Bank of America is a lead to a borrower in 2005, but Fleet was previously a lead to the borrower in 2000, then 
Bank of America would be considered a previous lead, as it acquired Fleet in 2004 and the loan date is after the merger date. 
Note also that all lenders are aggregated to their parent company and inherit the characteristics of the parent, as in Sufi (2007).
Lead fraction banks Fraction of the lead arrangers that are "banks".  These are lenders whose lender type is a "US bank" , "Western European bank", 
and so on.  The approach follows Gatev and Strahan (2009).
Lead country US Dummy = 1 if the lead arranger's country is in the US.  This information is from Dealscan.
Lead market share Market share of the lead arranger calculated over the 3 years previous to the loan.  This is limited to syndicated loans and
 loans on which the lead was previously a lead.
Repeat interactions lead to participant The number of links between the lead arranger and other members of the syndicate over the previous 3 years.  This measure is 
scaled by the number of previous loan facilities arranged by the lead.  As with the previous lead measure, acquiring firms 
inherit the relationships of their targets in the event of mergers.
Reciprocal Dummy = 1 if the lead arranger was a participant in a syndicate led by one of the current participants.  As with the repeat 
interaction and previous lead measures, acquiring firms inherit the relationships of their targets in the event of mergers.
Lead bank characteristics Note: This is available for a subset of lenders that are US banks (using bank holding company reports FR Y-9C, 4th quarter)
Size ( log(assets)) Natural log of lead assets. (bhck2170).
Capital  Capital ratio. (bhck3210/bhck2170).  Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Liquidity Liquid assets as a share of assets. Cash (bhck0081+bhck0395+bhck0397) + Securities (bhck1754+bhck1773) + 
Federal funds sold & reverse repos (bhdmb987+bhckb989) net of federal funds bought & repos (bhdmb993+bhckb995).  
Note that other series were used to create backward-consistent time series, this information is available upon request.
Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Ununsed commitments Unused commitments as a share of total unused commitments and gross loans, where unused commitments are defined as 
bhck3814 + bhck3816 + bhck3817 + bhck3818 + bhck6550 + bhck3411, and gross loans are bhck2122+bhck2123.
Income Net income ratio to total assets, where net income is before extraordinary items: bhck4300/bhck2170.  
Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Loan interest rate Derived interest rate on loans, where numerator is equal to interest on loans bhck4010 and the denominator is the year-average 
of the quarterly average series: bhck3516.  Note that other series were used to create backward-consistent time series for 
interest on loans, and this information is available upon request.  This is also the case for interest on deposits below.
Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Deposit interest rate Derived interest rate on deposits, where numerator is equal to interest on deposits bhcka517+bhcka518+ bhck6761+bhck4172, and 
the denominator is the year-average of the quarterly average series: bhck3517+bhck3404.  Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Wholesale interest rate Proxied by the expense on federal funds purchased and repos sold to quarterly averages of federal funds purchased 
and securities sold under agreements to repurchase: bhck4180/bhck3353.  Winsorized at 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.
Aggregate characteristics
GDP growth Year-on-year real GDP growth in the quarter of syndication, (from St Louis FRED GDPC1)
Commercial paper spread Spread between the 3-month CP rate for highly rated (AA) non-financial borrowers and the 3-month treasury bill rate 
in the week of syndication.  (from Board of Governors, H.15 release)Table A.1. Robustness Checks with Additional Loan Contract and Borrower Controls and Cyclicality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Instruments
0.0663** 0.07001** 0.0630** 0.0695**
(0.0260) (0.0337) (0.0294) (0.0270)
0.1108*** 0.1257*** 0.1130*** 0.1055***
(0.0304) (0.0385) (0.0349) (0.0311)
Contract characteristics
-0.0017** -0.0017* -0.0015* -0.0018**
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
0.9987** 0.0096* 1.0502** 0.0126* 1.2992** 0.0010 1.0887** 0.0094*
(0.4373) (0.0057) (0.4825) (0.0065) (0.5243) (0.0062) (0.4460) (0.0057)
-5.6774*** -0.0112* -5.9966*** -0.0073 -6.1572*** -0.0042 -5.8960*** -0.0123*
(0.3549) (0.0066) (0.3762) (0.0077) (0.3867) (0.0072) (0.3561) (0.0067)
-1.9445*** -0.0064 -2.4990*** -0.0086 -1.9500*** -0.0072 -2.2355*** -0.0072
(0.3841) (0.0056) (0.4139) (0.0066) (0.4237) (0.0061) (0.3807) (0.0058)
-1.1705* 0.0153 -0.9215 0.0103 -1.1848 0.0101 -1.1618* 0.0146
(0.6963) (0.0111) (0.7956) (0.0126) (0.7876) (0.0109) (0.7013) (0.0111)
-1.5921** -0.0094 -0.6021 -0.0101 -1.7847** -0.0113 -1.3377* -0.0084
(0.6959) (0.0084) (0.7782) (0.0100) (0.8492) (0.0095) (0.7019) (0.0084)
0.7955 0.0112 -1.1930 0.0056 -1.4108* -0.0080 -1.5134** 0.0037
(0.8098) (0.0129) (0.8402) (0.0130) (0.8150) (0.0108) (0.7368) (0.0111)
2.2557* -0.0299* 3.0096** -0.0216 3.2532** -0.0256 1.7535 -0.0309*












-0.6164 -0.0768*** 7.7275*** -0.0038 5.0437* -0.0200 0.9878 -0.0719**
(4.0507) (0.0291) (2.6636) (0.0265) (2.9893) (0.0343) (2.8593) (0.0283)
2.2821 0.0102 -6.1785** -0.0792*** -3.2728 -0.0388 1.1073 0.0075
(4.1202) (0.0233) (2.9978) (0.0246) (3.3831) (0.0315) (2.9671) (0.0220)
0.8464 0.0285 -7.4405*** -0.0518** -4.7000 -0.0179 -0.4695 0.0255
(4.0231) (0.0239) (2.5912) (0.0250) (2.9474) (0.0317) (2.7688) (0.0228)
-2.1673 0.0687*** -9.6288*** -0.0190 -7.6690*** 0.0141 -3.6829 0.0651***
(4.0267) (0.0256) (2.5217) (0.0242) (2.8944) (0.0321) (2.7738) (0.0242)
-1.9333 0.0904*** -9.8415*** 0.0132 -7.8429** 0.0390 -3.8417 0.0846***
(4.0687) (0.0287) (2.7062) (0.0299) (3.0272) (0.0358) (2.8705) (0.0278)
-0.0719 0.1528*** -7.9128*** 0.0772** -5.9846* 0.0895** -2.1608 0.1470***
(4.1644) (0.0336) (2.8386) (0.0352) (3.2042) (0.0393) (2.9981) (0.0327)
-1.4974 0.3824*** -10.1723** 0.3630*** -9.5907** 0.3282*** -3.4172 0.3747***
(5.1518) (0.0724) (4.4130) (0.0823) (4.2767) (0.0975) (4.2452) (0.0724)
-4.2049 0.7306*** -12.6745*** 0.6626*** -18.2833*** 0.7189*** -7.0102** 0.7183***
(4.5385) (0.0907) (3.5682) (0.0895) (4.6557) (0.1171) (3.5487) (0.0908)
-6.3677** -0.0988* -5.3853 -0.1423** -7.2944** -0.1044**
(3.1386) (0.0525) (3.6112) (0.0562) (3.2254) (0.0531)
-3.0603** 0.1083*** -6.1486*** 0.1256*** -3.7354** 0.1198*** -4.1559*** 0.1040***
(1.3783) (0.0286) (2.0513) (0.0448) (1.7282) (0.0356) (1.3542) (0.0289)
-2.3079*** 0.0133** -2.8049*** 0.0146** -1.5796*** 0.0103 -2.3087*** 0.0130**
(0.3246) (0.0056) (0.3832) (0.0072) (0.3552) (0.0062) (0.3241) (0.0056)
12.9886 0.0532 0.0746 0.0497 -6.7023 0.1248 10.7457 0.0445
(16.4307) (0.2629) (17.9938) (0.2935) (19.8072) (0.3099) (16.6674) (0.2652)
7.2303 0.8354** 16.9321 0.9227** 25.5160 0.8320** 8.4616 0.8334**
(20.5573) (0.3953) (22.1133) (0.4133) (24.5012) (0.4090) (20.8704) (0.3963)
-1.1665** -0.0028 -1.6571*** -0.0117 -1.7890*** -0.0048 -1.1960** -0.0026










-1.6323*** -0.0125 -0.9680 -0.0011 -1.3446** -0.0004 -1.5396** -0.0121
(0.6019) (0.0106) (0.6451) (0.0113) (0.6588) (0.0105) (0.6114) (0.0105)
-3.3360*** -0.0397** -1.9029 -0.0283 -2.6119* -0.0461** -2.9843** -0.0374**
(1.1795) (0.0179) (1.2752) (0.0198) (1.3569) (0.0196) (1.1810) (0.0178)
3.5268*** -0.0280 4.4612*** -0.0296 4.3118*** -0.0340 3.6655*** -0.0268
(0.9654) (0.0221) (1.0864) (0.0269) (1.1698) (0.0263) (0.9691) (0.0221)
-21.6982*** 0.0322 -23.7995*** 0.0278 -21.0365*** 0.0008 -22.1805*** 0.0298
(3.6848) (0.0390) (4.3262) (0.0455) (3.9672) (0.0369) (3.7034) (0.0390)
-0.3601 -0.0017 -0.2899 -0.0013 -0.2789 -0.0013 -0.3543 -0.0017
(0.2548) (0.0012) (0.2155) (0.0010) (0.2063) (0.0010) (0.2561) (0.0012)
Reciprocal -28.4109*** -0.0571* -30.5094*** -0.0736** -30.3211*** -0.0615* -29.3516*** -0.0611**




Observations 8995 8995 7170 7170 6918 6918 8996 8996
R
2 0.50 0.12 0.52 0.13 0.51 0.13 0.50 0.11
Notes:
All regressions include year, industry, and loan purpose dummies. 
The AAA rating is the omitted rating dummy in the regressions.
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses.

























Industry default probability, lead 3 
years
Lead lending limit, as lead
Lead lending limit, as participant
Size ( log(assets))








Log (1+ previous loans)
Equity amihud illiquidity
Equity bid-ask spread
Equity volatilityTable A.2. Robustness Checks: Opacity, Lead Exposure, and Subsequent Borrower Default
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Yes No Low High High Low High Low High Low
-0.0033*** -0.0002 -0.0028** -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0035** -0.00004
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0011)
Observations 4807 4189 4691 4305 3148 3770 3915 3003 3391 3527
R
2 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.12
Notes:
All regressions include the covariates in baseline regression, Table 2 col (3).  The regressions in col (3) and (4) also include a measure of firms in same industry,
and regressions in col (5) - (10) also include equity volatility, equity bid-ask spread, and equity amihud illiquidity measures
Leveraged loans are loans priced at 125 basis points or more above LIBOR.  See Appendix A for other variable definitions
Low refers to below the median, while High refers to above the median of the variable of interest.  See Table 1 for summary statistics
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Leveraged loan
Lead share
Firms in same industry Equity volatility Equity bid-ask spread Equity amihud illiquidityTable A.3. Robustness Checks: Other Measures of Long Run Performance
Panel A. Profitability (ROA), lead 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ROA Opaque Leveraged     
loan
Below median 
firms in same 
industry 






0.6021*** -0.0727** -0.0689 -0.0643** -1.8760 -0.0062 -0.0227
(0.1032) (0.0363) (0.0495) (0.0274) (1.2482) (0.0101) (0.0198)
0.0005 -0.0012** -0.0013 -0.0011** -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0004)
-0.0039* 0.0024** 0.0020 0.0018** 0.0399 0.0001 0.0005
(0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0297) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Observations 6222 6222 6222 6222 5290 5290 5290
R
2 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.22
Panel B. Altman Z-Score, lead 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Altman                
z-score
Opaque Leveraged    
loan
Below median 
firms in same 
industry 






1.0628*** -0.9595 -0.9802 -1.1731** -14.0113 -0.2839 -0.1253
(0.2252) (0.7223) (0.9189) (0.5521) (24.7482) (0.2559) (0.2821)
0.0306 -0.0229* -0.0234 -0.0262** -0.0129 -0.0128 -0.0091
(0.0219) (0.0117) (0.0165) (0.0103) (0.0151) (0.0081) (0.0072)
-0.0115* 0.0352 0.0313 0.0368** 0.2407 0.0067 0.0031
(0.0062) (0.0234) (0.0298) (0.0170) (0.5829) (0.0071) (0.0063)
Observations 6126 6126 6126 6126 5231 5231 5231
R
2 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.54
Panel C. Equity Volatility, lead 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Altman                
z-score
Opaque Leveraged     
loan
Below median 
firms in same 
industry 






-0.00383 0.00470 0.00908 -0.00212 -0.48939 0.00422** -0.00060
(0.00294) (0.00431) (0.00973) (0.00364) (0.36774) (0.00166) (0.00240)
-0.00034 0.00008 0.00016 -0.00001 -0.00053** 0.00011* 0.00001
(0.00027) (0.00007) (0.00015) (0.00006) (0.00024) (0.00006) (0.00006)
0.00011 -0.00016 -0.00031 0.00006 0.02176** -0.00011** 0.00002
(0.00008) (0.00014) (0.00032) (0.00012) (0.00880) (0.00005) (0.00006)
Observations 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291 5291
R
2 0.47 0.59 0.55 0.62 0.33 0.61 0.62
Notes:
All regressions include the covariates in baseline regression, Table 2 col (3), in addition to the borrower's Altman z-score at the time of syndication.  
Industry median performance controls are included, specifically ROA and Altman z-score (lead 3 years).  Regressions in Panels A and B colums (5)-(7) 
and Panel C also include equity volatility, equity bid-ask spread, and equity amihud illiquidity measures.  
Panel C also controls for market volatility, lead 3 years.
Opaque indicates those publicly traded borrowers without a rating.  Leveraged loans are loans priced at 125 basis points or more above LIBOR.  
See Appendix A for other variable definitions and Table 1 for summary statistics.
 Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses.
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Interaction term (X):